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Spaces of hope in authoritarian Turkey: Istanbul’s interconnected geographies 




People in Turkey are cowed into silence from especially 2015 onwards, since the two 
general elections, while the failed coup (July 2016) accelerated the pace of this 
process. This research, however, investigates existing forms of political voice 
following the Gezi Park protestsi (May-August 2013) and is concerned with newly 
formed political geographies in the center of Istanbul, specifically Kadıköy, Beşiktaş 
and Beyoğlu (Taksim) districts, and the ways in which activists transformed these 
spaces into ‘political parks’ and ‘spaces of hope’. Whitehead and Bozoğlu (2016) 
identify Taksim Square as a multivalent site and an identity place in the history of 
modern Turkey. Previously lower-class revolutionary neighbourhoods such as Gazi, 
Küçük Armutlu or Okmeydanı and the squares of middle-class central districts like 
Beyoğlu, Kadıköy and Beşiktaş were the main identity-places for protestors until park 
activism united parks and independent spaces in Istanbul during the Gezi. This study 
examines the cross-cutting of various political movements in their use of parks as 
social and political spaces in the post-Occupy Turkey. Although these movements 
have not necessarily resulted in concrete achievements yet, using and testing Occupy 
methods in the Occupy spaces in the post-Occupy period would determine the future 
of global social movements.  
The articulation of ‘everywhere’ as the all-encompassing political geography 
of resistance during the Gezi led to the formation of park occupations across Turkey 
rather than ‘isolating’ the protests to the Gezi Park. Solidarity networks in local 
neighbourhoods, political, creative and art events and environmental social 
movements constituted the Gezi’s spatial and organisational legacy but, most 
importantly, the protests marked parks as political geographies. Previous social 
movements helped the formation of the Gezi and, in turn, the Gezi enabled unfolding 
of newer political imaginaries and geographies. This paper argues that following the 
Gezi, the political parks and woods brought together anti-capitalist Muslims, 
environmental and ecological activists, academic initiatives, feminists, urban 
chambers, unions and independent activists, which are represented via their own 
political voices throughout the paper. It points out that the spatial strategies remaining 
from the Gezi, such as occupations, participatory methods like forums, creative 
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dissidence like political concerts, festivals or crowdfunding have been persistent in 
shaping the post-Occupy spatial activism in Turkey. This paper also articulates how 
‘Gezi’s children’ continued to use ‘spaces of hope’ not only to go against the Islamist 
neo-liberal policies of the current government but also to question the sustainability 
and effectiveness of some of the Gezi’s ‘ongoing set of everyday practices’ such as 
the forum structure. Although the Gezi became the largest and most dramatic protest 
movement in the recent history of Turkey, ensuing social movements remained 
comparably small in the face of increasing authoritarianism. Despite smaller in scope, 
these social movements have been a consistent force in tackling AKP’s authoritarian 
urban politics.  
This research makes the case for how people engage with the emergent sites of 
social movements not only at their peak but also within other ‘cycles of moments’ 
(Sofos, 2017) and is based on two phases of ethnographic research conducted in 
Istanbul from 2013 to 2017 with the ‘children of the Gezi’. By using a spatial 
ethnography, it looks at the performance of spatial activism formed in and around 
‘political’ parks in the context of increasingly authoritarian Turkey to examine the 
ways in which protest spaces extend, amplify, contribute to, or limit performances of 
activism. This paper is concerned with how place and space impact on people’s 
translation of their grievances into collective political protest (Routledge: 1996, 2003; 
Polletta, 1999; Miller, 2000; Martin & Miller, 2003; Leontidou, 2010; Monterescu 
and Shaindlinger, 2013) and illustrates political geographies of collective action 
(Staeheli, 1994; Amin 2008; Luger, 2016; Arampatzi, 2017; Eder & Öz, 2017). In the 
existing literature, networks are identified as more vital components of new social 
movements than their spaces (Diani, 2000; 2003; Castells, 2004; 2011; 2015; 
Anduiza, Cristancho & Sabucedo, 2014) but this research shows the ways in which 
vernacular networks and movement cultures are formed geographically and physical 
spaces play important roles in shaping their specific functions whilst feeding 
collective imaginaries of activist networks. Thus, the first part of the paper introduces 
the notion of ‘spaces of hope’ in relation to the concepts of ‘cycles of protests’ and 
‘repertoires of collective action’ within the context of studies on new social 
movements, which informs the ensuing section on the spatial ethnography used in 
Istanbul following the Gezi until 2017. The article then conceptualises and 
historicises contemporary authoritarian urbanism in Turkey and lays out the findings 
of this study involving key activists with environmental and ecological agendas in 
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‘political parks’ across Istanbul to account for the ways the spatial strategies of Gezi 
fed into consecutive social movements.  
 
2.Spaces of Hope and Cycles of Protests during and following the Gezi protests 
David Harvey (2000: 196-199) coined the concept of ‘spaces of hope’ to ‘pull 
together a spatio-temporal or dialectical urbanism, which lead to conversations about 
alternatives and possibilities against global capitalism’. While Harvey’s account 
embraces a theoretical perspective, other studies employ the term to bring empirical 
evidence into contemporary activist spaces and resistances (Phillips, 2009; Novy & 
Colomb, 2013; Luger, 2016). Luger’s research on the Singaporean activist spaces 
(2016) delineates ‘the possibilities of material and digital spaces as sites of political 
engagement in Singapore since they bring together groups that would not normally 
come together, thus forming spaces of hope’. While concentrating on offline space-
making practices, this study does not capture digital practices of activists in the post-
Gezi era. Rather, it suggests that ‘spaces of hope’ emerged out of Turkey’s activist 
milieu, as cultural groups form coalitions and alliances in parks around specific issues 
related to perceived social, political and economic injustice due to policies of the 
Islamist neo-liberal state in the post-Gezi period. In addition to ‘spaces of hope’, I call 
the previously occupied parks ‘political parks’ where identities of protestors 
transform and intersect while producing strategies to challenge authoritarianism. In 
his work on the Egyptian and Iranian social movements, Bayat (1997; 2012) defines 
the spaces of contentious political action as ‘political street’, highlighting the need in 
authoritarian contexts to focus on ‘spatialities of discontent’ or ‘how particular spatial 
forms shape, galvanise, and accommodate insurgent sentiments and solidarities’.  
Existing research examines the ways spatio-temporal dimensions of previous 
action feed newer social movements. Tilly (1986: 176) defines the notion of 
‘repertoires of collective action’ as ‘accumulated experience that change continuously 
because of previous action. These repertoires interact with the strategies of authorities 
to make some forms of action more feasible, attractive and frequent than others’. 
Tarrow (1993: 284-286) coins the terms ‘protest cycles’ and ‘heightened conflicts’, 
both of which imply sequence of stages. They characterise periods of social unrest by 
producing new or transformed symbols and frames of meaning around which 
following mobilisations take place not only in relations, but also in the streets, 
villages or schools. McAdam and Sewell (2001) point to the vitality of temporality in 
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social movements and use the term ‘transformative events’ to refer to waves of 
protests and/or social change. Following Halvorsen’s study (2015: 404) with Occupy 
London, this research conceptualises activism ‘not as a moment of rupture but an 
ongoing set of everyday practices through which the transition to post-capitalist 
worlds takes place’. While Halvorsen (2015: 403) captures the emergent tensions 
between occupations as a moment of rupture and a space-time of everyday life, Juris 
(2012) identifies how Occupy Boston was based on a ‘logic of aggregation’ that 
involves the coming together of activists to inhabit space such as squares, boulevards 
and roundabouts for an indefinite period and ‘render these sites iconic’ (McGahern, 
2017: 92). In the context of the cycle of Gezi, this study stresses the three-fold role of 
the previously occupied parks that became ‘iconic’; forming communities and 
alliances, unfolding spatial emotions and testing the participatory strategies of the 
Occupy movements.  
The Gezi was formed as an opposition to the radical urban restructuring 
programmes and the commodification of urban space (Kuymulu, 2013; Karakayali & 
Yaka, 2014) and opened new possibilities in challenging growing competitive 
authoritarianism. ‘The anti-capitalist dimension was a noteworthy characteristic of 
Gezi but its driving social force ‘was the alienation of non-conservative citizens (e.g. 
secularists, liberals, and Alevis) from the AKP, which represent a social force 
opposed to the AKP’s construction of a new collective identity and political regime—
the ‘New Turkey’ (Goksel & Tekdemir, 2018: 382). During the uprising, a variety of 
different groups coalesced, created a ‘park culture’ (Özdüzen Ateşman, 2015: 695; 
Özdüzen, 2018: 1043) and instigated networks of mutual aid and solidarity between 
lived spacetimes of intensity to deal with various implications of the ‘New Turkey’. 
The initial responses on the Gezi deemed the participants as constituting a ‘new 
middle-class movement’ (Arat, 2013; Keyder, 2013), but more extensive research 
described protestors coming from different groups and communities (Kuymulu, 2013; 
Karakayali & Yaka, 2014; Abbas & Yigit, 2015; Suner, 2017). As Kuymulu (2013) 
shows, the specific anxieties caused by the repressive and authoritarian government, 
brought together a whole body of different interest groups, including 
environmentalists, yuppies, vegans and vegetarians, youth, LGBTI+, anti-capitalist 
Muslims, the hyper-secular nationalists, Kurds and Alevis. Abbas and Yiğit (2015) 
also addressed the multiplicity of groups that protested in the Gezi Park with little 
prior affiliation in the history of Turkey, from Kemalists (that aimed to protect the 
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Atatürk’s way) to Kurds (that intended to protest the Turkish state, including the 
AKP), as the events created a national swell of sympathy and ownership.  
However, ‘with an exception of a few examples, the literature on the Gezi 
hardly discusses the political significance of Gezi’s practices and its festive and 
commune-like character that constituted and sustained the occupation of the park’ 
(Çıdam, 2017: 378). The practices from previous social movements and political 
geographies helped the formation and consolidation of the Gezi such as ‘the struggle 
to keep the Emek movie theatre’ (2010-2015), which relied on activists/audiences’ 
DIY media activities in protest spaces (Özdüzen, 2018: 1043) or the political 
mobilisation of the football fan group çArşı that brought together community activism 
with neighborhood-based rhythms and rituals, generating a new urban sociability 
(Eder & Öz, 2017: 58). Similarly, the Gezi left its own remark on the spatial practices 
of consecutive social movements in the post-Occupy era. Erensü and Karaman (2017, 
13-22) examine how ‘the Gezi enabled new political imaginaries that connected 
various political and grassroots mobilisations across the urban–rural continuum’ by 
for instance concentrating on struggles against HES (small hydro) projects that turned 
valleys into construction sites as the AKP launched aggressive HES programmes’. 
Furthermore, Akçalı’s research (2018: 7), which rests on her participation in park 
forums in Abbasağa, Yoğurtçu, Cihangir and Maçka between July 2013 and August 
2014 shows how the park forums helped nourish a pluralistic ethos in society and 
provided safe ground where disagreements could be peacefully negotiated but ‘the 
unproblematised class divide between participants and organisers and the different 
degrees to which they were affected by existing socio-economic exploitation and 
impoverishment hindered genuine practices of agonistic politics and the formation of 
radical political alternatives (Akçalı, 2018: 14). This study captures ongoing 
conversations in the aftermath of 2014, focusing on how self-identified ‘children of 
Gezi’ continuously tested Gezi’s tactics and strategies and aimed to respond 
authoritarian policies by using parks as operational grounds and spaces for visibility 
even if they have not yet formed radical political alternatives. 
 
3.Methodology 
This research relies on a place-based ethnography where spaces become objects of 
ethnographic inquiry, looking into the social construction of space and place-making. 
A contemporary ethnography of space, according to Low (2017: 6), is process-
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oriented; person, object and community-based; and allows for multiple forms of 
agency and political possibilities. It explores ‘the spatial contexts of the research 
encounter in everyday places such as homes or living environments (Porter et al., 
2010) and less familiar environments such as protest sites (Anderson, 2004)’ (Holton 
& Riley, 2014: 59). Holton and Riley (2014) examine student geographies in England, 
by using a place-based ethnographic interviewing with students when they are on the 
move between different student places. Following Marcus (1995), this study is based 
on a multi-site ethnography, which examines practices of people in motion across 
locations. While my ethnography was park-based, I moved between parks and smaller 
in-door places of activism.  
My early observations and access to activist networks owe back to my initial 
ethnographic research for my doctoral thesis prior to, during and right after the Gezi 
in 2013 and 2014, which captured cultural activism in the spaces of Gezi and in other 
creative spaces that ‘mimicked the Gezi experience’. My ethnographic observations 
for this research commenced in 2015, followed by my ethnographic interviews and 
participant observation during the Gezi commemorations, Gezi-related events and 
demonstrations at the parks in 2016 and 2017 and my participation in some of the 
Yeryüzü Sofraları (Earth Tables) in May-June 2016 and May-August 2017 to trace in 
what ways Gezi’s communities, strategies and methods in key spaces persisted. While 
my initial research participants provided access to other members of activist 
communities through personal recommendation, I also used snowballing method to 
recruit key activists following the Gezi, which implies that newer contacts helped me 
reach other activists. With my place-based ethnographic in-depth interviews in 2016 
and 2017, I reached out leading activists and key members of civil societies that have 
been the symbols of the Gezi, remaining active about Gezi-related activities and 
protests at the parks and independent spaces whilst retaining most of their focus on 
urban issues. While my field notes during and after my visits to parks enabled 
recording of everyday activism in protest spaces, in-depth interviews with 31 key 
activists, whose ages ranged from 23 to 66, opened a space to draw out their 
sentiments and thoughts about spatial activism in the post-Occupy period until 2017. I 
chose the research participants based on their use of parks and public spaces with 
organisations related to urban issues and my general aim was to select the most active 
participants. 
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While some of the interviews took place at parks, for security purposes 
following the failed coup in 2016, I conducted some other interviews in community 
centres, union offices and local district branches of political parties such as the HDP 
(Halkların Demokratik Partisi - People’s Democratic Party) office in Beyoğlu. In 
Istanbul, ‘Gezi protestors hailed from neighbourhoods dominated by high-income 
earning secular Turks (Etiler, Nişantaşı, and Bebek) as well as from largely low-
income earning worker areas (Gaziosmanpaşa and Ümraniye), radicalised left-wing 
Alevi areas (1 Mayıs Mahallesi, Gazi, Okmeydanı, and Alibeyköy), and 
predominantly middle-class ones (Beşiktaş and Kadıköy)’ (Goksel & Tekdemir, 
2018: 383). Although majority of the protests that constitute the axis of this research, 
except for Earth Tables, could not reach out blue collar working-class people living in 
the extensions of Istanbul, the post-Gezi activists differed in age, ethnic and socio-
economic background. The common political identification of my informants was 
HDP, the pro-Kurdish party, not necessarily because they were Kurdish but because 
of their belief in equality and freedom for everyone. Some of my informants also had 
organic ties to progressive communities within the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - 
Republican People’s Party). 
During my field visits to Gezi Park (Beyoğlu), Abbasağa Park (Beşiktaş), 
Yoğurtçu Park (Kadıköy), Maçka Democracy Park (Şişli), Özgürlük Park 
(Göztepe/Kadıköy) and Validebağ Woods (Üsküdar), I had fieldwork interactions 
with self-identified children of the Gezi, including Yoğurtçu Kadın Forumu 
(Yoğurtçu Women’s Forum), Göztepe Forum, Kadıköy Kooperatifi (Kadıköy 
Cooperative), Kuzey Ormanları Savunması (Northern Forests Defense) and Don 
Kişot İşgal Evi (Don Quixote Squat) as well as the Validebağ Savunması (Validebağ 
Defense), Anti-capitalist Muslims and TMMOB (Union of Chambers of Turkish 
Engineers and Architects). The first four organisations respectively were formed 
during and following the Gezi whereas the Validebağ Defense, the Anti-capitalist 
Muslims and the TMMOB commenced prior to the protests. Along with the LGBTI+ 
communities, Anti-capitalist Muslims and TMMOB became the main symbols of the 
Gezi and continued to use its strategies and spaces, while Validebağ Resistance was 
referred to as the ‘small Gezi’ in 2014, constituting the largest urban resistance 
following the Gezi. This research, however, does not capture LGBTI+ communities’ 
activism in the aftermath of the Gezi protests and retains focus on the experiences of 
urban collectives and self-identified ‘Children of the Gezi’. Throughout my 
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fieldwork, I asked interviewees to speak about their role and nature of involvement in 
local park activism and to reflect on a series of themes such as relations between 
space and activism, participation and democracy, interpretations of the limits of park 
activism, particularly with regards to increasing levels of state violence.  
 
Figure 1. Taksim Gezi Park, Beyoğlu Sineması (Movie Theatre) and the Taksim Square (Map data 
©2018 Google). 
 
Figure 2. Maçka Democracy Park and Abbasağa Park in Beşiktaş and Şişli (Map data ©2018 
Google).
 
Figure 3. Yoğurtçu Park, Validebağ Park (Woods) and Özgürlük Park (Map data ©2018 Google). 
 
4.Turkey’s Authoritarian Urban Culture and Politics 
 9 
Turkey moved to authoritarianism shortly after the Gezi, which is defined as 
‘competitive or neo-authoritarianism’ (Akçalı & Korkut, 2015; Esen & Gümüşçü, 
2016). AKP embraces the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which has been the main 
characteristic of right-wing parties in Turkey since the 1980s. ‘AKP’s pragmatic and 
populist use of motives from within Turkish nationalism and Islamic culture as its 
foreign and economic policies, such as its pro-EU foreign policy and neo-liberal 
economic initiatives (anti-protectionist and globalist), account for its neo-liberal and 
Islamist agenda (Coşar et al., 2012: 89). Islamist neo-liberalism in Turkey started 
during Özal’s period, after the coup d’etat in 1980, later benefiting from the local 
governments of the RP (Refah Partisi - Welfare Party) after 1994. RP was the first 
party to adopt political Islam as its direct goal, which was an outcome of the military 
coup and the neoliberal economic policies of Özal’s era since the mid-1980s that 
relied on privatisation of all sectors. The key members of the AKP such as Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül were members of RP in the 1990s.  
Under Erdoğan’s AKP government (2002-…), economic policies also became 
increasingly neoliberal, leading to further consolidation of this mode of capital 
accumulation (Tanyılmaz, 2015: 111). AKP adhered to the IMF-supervised crisis 
management programme and continued this trend in its later periods. Currently, 
Turkey is undergoing a severe economic crisis in 2018, following a currency crisis 
fueled by the collapse in Turkish lira. Rather than taking responsibility, AKP relates 
this to the conspirations of dış mihraklar (external forces) that aim to weaken Turkey 
and the support for Erdoğan. Bozkurt-Güngen (2018: 1) ‘challenges the claim that an 
authoritarian turn emerged only after the early 2010s and argues that a deeper 
authoritarianism was embedded in the neoliberal experience in Turkey that facilitated 
the expansion of the authoritarian repertoire under the AKP governments. Bozkurt-
Güngen (2018: 15) calls this ‘embedded authoritarianism that limits popular 
democratic empowerment and was followed by a shift in the predominant 
authoritarian technique from a rule-based/technocratic strategy to a more 
discretionary one in the 2010s. After the November 2015 elections, AKP bolstered it 
with overt coercion against oppositional social forces’.  
Furthermore, ‘the AKP governments distribute patronage through privatisation 
and redistribution of rents within the upper income brackets, bringing the “periphery”, 
its conservative, nationalist and non-affluent supporters, to the “centre” and elevating 
them to a new bourgeoisie, which help them gain the loyalty of conservative and 
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religious voters. They also punish businesses that are critical of their rule’ (Yilmaz & 
Bashirov, 2018: 8). Yilmaz and Bashirov (2018: 2) identify the emergent political 
regime in Turkey as Erdoganism, which has four main dimensions: electoral 
authoritarianism as the electoral system, neopatrimonialism as the economic system, 
populism as the political strategy and Islamism as the political ideology. Today, the 
AKP transforms the constitution and executes the presidential system whilst the 
culture of Sunni Islam extends via censorship, the construction of mosques, new 
education system, more references to the Quran in daily speech and increasing 
practice of sex segregation in daily life, together with the consolidation of a neo-
liberal culture by for instance shopping-mallisation (Özdüzen, 2018: 1030-1031). The 
coup attempt, according to Lüküslü (2016: 638-645) mark a new phase in the 
imposition of a new form of Turkishness, an Islamised version of national identity, 
and the creation of pious generations with implications of reframing the Kemalist 
youth myth into an Islamic conservative one. 
AKP also initiated a construction-based growth model beginning in 2002 
(Çavuşoğlu and Strutz, 2014: 141) as ‘neoliberal urban policies are used to legitimise 
the enhancement of authoritarian governance and governments use urban areas not 
only as a growth machine but also as grounds for a socio-political transformation 
project’ (Eraydin & Tasan-Kok, 2014: 111). During the late AKP period, 
construction-sector led policies and projects spread to vast and widespread areas with 
aggressive projects such as ‘mega projects’ or hydroelectric power plants (Alkan, 
2015, p. 850). AKP use an authoritarian understanding of urban renewal in various 
parts of Turkey by building hydropower plants in the culturally and spatially specific 
context of the Eastern Black Sea region of Turkey (Yaka, 2017) or by ‘regenerating’ 
Kurdish neighborhoods such as Sur in Diyarbakır following an intense military 
operation and police campaign that severely destroyed the district (Turem, 2017: 40). 
The bulldozer neo-liberalism (Lovering & Türkmen, 2011) in Istanbul operated all 
around the city, from the peripheries to the centre, in order to transform it not only as 
a centre of commerce, tourism and business, but also to show that it symbolises a 
brand-new era/regime. Today, the AKP also aims to Islamise Istanbul, which implies 
the increasing penetration of mosques, the boom of neo-Ottoman style and decreasing 
numbers of alternative spaces for any other cultural, religious and ethnic groups, apart 
from the majority Sunni Turks.  
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5.Post-Gezi spaces countering-the growing authoritarian urbanism 
 
As with the Gezi’s main motivation to go against the neo-liberal and authoritarian 
policies of AKP by using the Gezi Park and other parks across Turkey, the ongoing 
spatial struggles aimed to challenge multiple aspects of authoritarian urban politics by 
instigating spatial strategies of urban resistance. Cities not only play a central role 
within the development of counter-austerity politics (Peck, 2012) in Greece or Spain, 
but they also assume fundamental roles in challenging Islamist neo-liberal ideologies 
in Turkey. In her activist ethnographic research with ‘bottom-up’ democratic politics 
in the post-Syntagma occupation period in Athens of crisis, Arampatzi (2017: 2158) 
shows the ways localised initiatives and solidarity structures are formed, countering 
the effects of austerity on the social reproduction of urban populations, through 
everyday practices of mutual aid and solidarity-making in neighbourhoods. In the 
case of Occupy London’s two protest camps, as studied by Halvorsen (2015: 401-
402), ‘the taking of space was the defining act, having become a central feature of 
diverse uprisings around the world recently, from Taksim Square to Puerta, which 
involves a tension between moments of rupture, lived spacetimes of intensity that 
provide an opening to new possibilities’. 
Growing literature on the post-Occupy situation questions the tactics and 
legitimacy of the Occupy, whilst challenging the theoretical and practical validity of 
existing paradigms to throw light on the emerging social movements (Mayer, 2013, 
Chou, 2015; Lam, 2015; Arampatzi, 2017). Chou (2015: 46) conceptualises the post-
Occupy condition as ‘a passage from crisis to crisis’ in that the Occupy Movement 
also embroiled in its own democratic crisis. As an instance of this, Lam (2015: 118-
119) studies Hong-Kong’s post-Occupy situation in which the prospect of 
consolidating a democratic model has been remote and the legitimacy problem of the 
government has further extended amidst divisions within the society as the movement 
did not result in consensus. Mayer’s (2013: 5-6) research on urban activism in the 
global North following the Occupy, points out that much of the conceptual and 
theoretical framework traditionally used for understanding the dynamics and potential 
of urban activism is not helpful in highlighting the reconfiguration of the relations 
between social movements and local states: what used to be an antagonistic 
relationship transformed into a more cooperative one, as newly installed innovative 
urban revitalisation programmes encouraged movement organisations to move ‘from 
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protest to program’. Although ‘the protest to program’ (Mayer’ 2013) has not been 
feasible in Turkey, the post-Gezi spatial activism transformed from ‘crisis to crisis’ 
(Chou, 2015). In especially activists’ collaboration with local initiatives, unions and 
their formation of neighbourhood initiatives in a passage to crisis, this research 
delineates the tactics and strategies that cope with Turkish state while also 
questioning the organisation of networks and the shortcomings of the existing 
practices. 
In the same manner with the Gezi experience, the first year of the Gezi 
anniversaries in 2014 was marked by the multiplicity of intersectional alliances such 
as those between environmental organisations, political parties and anti-capitalist 
groups. Likewise, the common slogans in 2014 were ‘Thief, Murderer AKP’ and 
‘This is only beginning, we will keep on fighting’, which were two trademark slogans 
of the Gezi. The traditional characteristic of the Gezi commemorations such as the 
street march and demonstrations took place on the Taksim Square and the Istiklal 
Street whilst the cultural component of the commemorations such as the Gezi festival 
and symbolic forums occurred at the Abbasağa Park, Yoğurtçu Park and Don Quiote 
Squat. Beyza Üstün (Academics For Peace, ecology platforms, HDP & No! 
Platforms), whom actively used the parks following the Gezi as an environmentalist 
and academic activist, defined the vitality of the Abbasağa Park and other parks for 
activist communities and the public: 
Parks are spaces where people rest, run, meet, chat, wait, think and sleep. 
They are places where homeless people find shelter and animals walk freely. 
That’s why we wanted to keep them via actively using them after the Gezi by 
organising ‘Street Academies’ in the face of the totalitarianism of universities 
and No Platforms! against Erdoğan’s presidency campaign.  
A consistent theme that my informants alluded to was the idea that parks retained 
their characteristic as the centre of everyday social activities whilst also transforming 
into the nexus of political action following the protests. The government declared a 
State of Emergency for three months immediately following the attempted coup on 
the 15th of July in 2016 and has renewed it ever since. This enables the AKP to 
legislate using decree laws that do not require parliament to grant approval. Following 
the coup attempt, state authorities have targeted 7,429 academic and administrative 
personnel for dismissal through emergency decrees. Since ‘the Academics for Peace’ 
signed the petition “We will not be a party to this crime!” in January 2016, some of 
the signatories were fired from their jobs, some of their passports were cancelled, they 
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were prevented from finding jobs, some of them were taken into custody or 
imprisoned and they currently face individualised court. Despite this coercion, some 
members of this community formed Street Academies in parks to actively use public 
spaces with an aim to continue teaching, create visibility, reach out to public and most 
importantly, claim their right to spaces and education.  
My research participants were preoccupied with the use of public and semi-
public spaces in alternative and creative ways against the homogenising efforts of the 
government, such as the foundation of Street Academies and organisation of public 
lectures in parks against the regime’s increasing assaults on journalists, intellectuals, 
civil society members and especially academics. The park lectures brought together 
academics, members of progressive unions, students, architects, urban planners, 
journalists and independent activists. On the other hand, some of these academics, 
like Beyza Üstün were already part of wider political parties like the HDP and 
ecology movement. Also, Beyza Üstün was involved in the ‘No’ camp that was 
composed of various grassroots organisations from women’s movements to Don’t 
Touch My School! initiatives, from unions to political parties including CHP and 
HDP. Parks and other inner spaces such as wedding halls enabled activists’ 
engagement in practical local no campaigns against AKP in 2017. ‘Despite the 
government’s unfair advantages and its alliance with the MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi – Nationalist Movement Party), the ‘Yes’ side prevailed by only a small 
margin in June 2017, denying Erdoğan the sweeping endorsement he expected’ (Esen 
& Gumuscu, 2017: 303).  
Mücella Yapıcı (TMMOB, No! Platforms and women’s movements) was 
active in the organisation of the annual events on the anniversary dates of the Gezi, 
participated in Gezi-related activities whilst also actively using the rest of the 
remaining alternative spaces in Istanbul, hence contributing to the formation of new 
identity places: 
What we do is to use the parks and other public spaces against the violence of 
the Islamising and privatising state. They want us to spend time at shopping 
malls when sending our children to religious vocational schools, but we need 
to get together using our existing urban commons. I go to parks, Beyoğlu 
Movie Theatre (BMT) and other public spaces to just use them against their 
ideology.  
TMMOB became the voice of those who oppose the commodification of urban land, 
especially in the built-up areas that formerly belonged to the public, and the loss of 
urban values and assets (Eraydin & Tasan-Kok, 2014: 120). As the head of 
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environmental issues research center in TMMOB and spokesperson of the Taksim 
Solidarity Network, Mücella Yapıcı became one of the most important voices of park 
forums and Gezi-related demonstrations during and following the movement. Because 
of her practical work in the parks and the union prior to and during the uprising, she 
was taken into custody along with her daughter and other members of the Taksim 
Solidarity Network. I accessed her through activist circles within urban planners 
which are quite politically active in Turkey and interviewed her in May 2017. On the 
day, she was preoccupied with another demolition of a residential historical building 
in Beyoglu and was seeking help from other organisations and unions, which shows 
her everyday struggle against neo-liberal urban politics of the AKP. To create 
networks of solidarity, she has also been at the forefront of park activism. Urban 
commons in the 2010s became symbols of public imagination and solidarity whilst 
shaping activists’ political action and their sentiments, culminating in the Gezi. Urban 
commons involve “being-in-common” or using resources in shared and non-
subtractable ways through “commoning” practices. (Gidwani & Baviskar, 2011: 42). 
Chatterton (2010) defines the act of commoning as a means to promote stronger 
spatial justice in the city, identifying three ways in which to understand the potential 
of the urban common; to see the whole city as a common and a site for resistance; to 
decommodify urban life and culture and to try to build the urban commons by 
introducing new political imaginaries through struggles in the city. Seen in this light, 
the commoning of the city can mean both concrete actions in and alternative 
imaginations of urban space (Lundman, 2018: 4). Following the Gezi, activists 
continued commoning parks, movie theatres and other public spaces like Kamp 
Armen, an Armenian orphanage in Istanbul that was home to an act of commoning for 
175 days in 2015 following plans of demolition.  
As part of their desire of commoning the city, activists campaigned about the 
potential demise of the BMT in the summer of 2017, which has been active since 
1989 and is one of the remaining independent spaces in Beyoğlu. The campaign was 
not leaderless as one of the new managers of BMT, Cem Altınsaray, acted almost like 
the leader of the movement in mobilising people on online and offline platforms. 
Although the movement had a leader figure whereby the activists referred to in their 
actions, the grassroots communities equally referred to the Gezi and park activism to 
express their reasons of participation in the movement related to this urban common. 
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Can, whom I spoke at the desk to sell BMT loyalty cards in front of the movie theatre 
in June 2017, said: 
On my first year as an undergraduate student, the Gezi broke out and I became 
a part of it. I started to get to know Istiklal Street then learnt how I could stand 
with people that I didn’t previously know and how total strangers could 
behave nicely and sympathetic to each other. The next struggle that I 
sympathised with was the struggle to keep the BMT. There is a beautiful sprit 
here at the movie theatre, we stand together voluntarily to sell cards. It all 
started through Cem’s tweet, but the real change can only happen if people use 
BMT and buy its loyalty card.  
 
Although an important channel for their mobilisation was social media, activists’ 
offline presence in the BMT sparked more visibility and generated financial support 
for keeping the movie theatre. The collective imaginations of activists took the Gezi 
as a reference point in keeping public spaces from privatisation and/or gentrification. 
They created ‘a space of hope’ from an independent movie theatre on decay. In their 
descriptions of the small initiative to keep the BMT, activists used words like joyful 
and beautiful during my visits to this field site. The concept of ‘politics of emotions’ 
(see Lutz & Abu Lughod et al., 1990; Zembylas, 2010) deals with various ways in 
which emotions are individual as well as political and are formed in social, political, 
and cultural spaces. The joyful and beautiful feelings unfolded through activists’ 
political interaction with and communal place-making practices on commons such as 
the BMT. Activists protected the BMT as it is in 2017, but it still faces severe 
financial problems. Although their activities on BMT were not related to the parks per 
se, activists’ use of alternative place-making tactics such as actively using the venue 
itself and engagement in crowdfunding and creative mobilisation were inherited from 
the Gezi.  
In parks and other symbolic public spaces across Istanbul like movie theatres, 
activists used conventional ways of protesting such as press releases and marches but 
they also organised art events and parties in relation to perceived political and cultural 
problems. In their weekly park meetings since the Gezi, Yoğurtçu Women’s Forum 
activated the Yoğurtçu Park to plan their activities, organise events, create visibility in 
public spaces and reach out other women passing by. Yoğurtçu Women’s Forum was 
formed out of the call of the Istanbul Feminist Collective on social media during the 
Gezi. A diversity of women coming from different feminist communities first met on 
the 26th of June 2013 at Yoğurtçu Park and formed Yoğurtçu Women’s Forum when 
the Gezi Park was active. Since then, they have been an independent initiative which 
 16 
has collaborated with other women’s groups, local initiatives, political parties and 
other solidarity networks. Selin Top from Yoğurtçu Women’s Forum explains: 
Other than traditional demonstrations, we organised women-only parties and 
festivals in the parks. We also initiated panels on feminist psychology, 
produced graffiti on the walls of the streets and the parks in Kadıköy. While 
we used our forums to organise against increasing numbers of women being 
killed, we also coalesced with other groups to support the Justice and 
Conscience Watches by HDP taking place at Yoğurtçu Park to promote peace 
and create newer alliances.  
 
Brown and Pickerill (2009: 28) show that expressing opposition through performance 
(for example dancing in costume during protests) enables activists to intensely feel 
and express their protest, perhaps more powerfully than through instrumental 
mobilisations (such as more formal street march with placards). While instrumental 
organisation still constituted an important feature of political action in the 2010s, local 
initiatives, urban collectives, feminist and LGBTI+ communities were involved in 
cultural forms of spatial activism, for instance throwing parties in political parks or 
keeping ‘watches’ with their own bodies, which implies that activists used less 
instrumentalised forms of political action even in their alliances with conventional 
political parties. This way, they kept their public spaces from the invasion of the 
government, felt the spirit and emotions of the Gezi such as ‘joyfulness’ and 
‘togetherness’ in its symbolic spaces, connected with non-activists around the park, 
which has blurred the boundaries between activists and non-activists. A lot of women 
that were only passing by the park, got involved in the Yoğurtçu Women’s Platform’s 
activities, which fostered visibility and prospects for a common political opening. I 
should note that this platform was born when ‘the feminist movement became more 
visible and active in the 2010s, reaching a new level especially after Erdoğan declared 
that abortion is murder in May 2012, leading feminists to adopt the slogan, “Keep 
your hands off my body”. A year later, the same slogan was re-appropriated by a 
diverse group of people who came together under the banner of “Keep your hands off 
my city” to protest Emek’s destruction, signalling the importance of establishing 
commonalities between different struggles through speech practices. After the Gezi, 
what brought all groups together were parks and spatial activism, so there was a 
passage from speech to place-making practices’ (Cidam, 2017: 385). In this period, 
feminist collectives such as Yoğurtçu Women’s Platform formed out of place-making 
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practices as they claimed their right to parks and other public spaces with their 
presence and bodies. 
While grassroots organisations used various spatial tactics to protect their 
public spaces and create alliances in political parks, the Göztepe Forum and forums in 
Abbasağa Park organised against Islamisation of the city and education system by 
establishing demos and forums and forming a collective namely Okuluma Dokunma! 
(Don’t Touch My School!). Mainly using ‘occupation’ as a method and keeping 
watches against the construction of mosques in green areas, Eymen Demircan talked 
about the most important actions the Göztepe Forum at Özgürlük Park took following 
the protests:  
I went to the Yoğurtçu Park immediately after police raided Gezi Park, but 
shortly after I went to the park in my neighbourhood, the Özgürlük Park in 
Göztepe, and organised with my local communities. We did not know each 
other, belonged to different ideological backgrounds, generations and sexual 
orientations. There were people from Kurdish political movements, Kemalist 
aunts and uncles, youth and elderly people. It was like a commune experience. 
We organised forums to solve our problems in the neighbourhood but we were 
not nostalgic about the Gezi. We organised against the transformation of 
Tuğlacıbaşı Mosque into an Islamic-Ottoman social complex along with it the 
formation of Quran courses for kids. We delayed it for three years with our 
events and demonstrations. There was also a public land of provincial 
directorate of agriculture in Caddebostan, we occupied this place for a while 
and prevented its privatisation. Furthermore, we organised against the 
transformation of the Yeşilbahar Primary School into an imam hatip high 
school (religious vocational school) along with the parents by using the forum 
structure. We named the initiative ‘Don’t Touch My School’ and protected it 
with our months of struggle. 
 
One of the most important achievements of the Göztepe Park Forum, as exemplified 
by Eymen, was activists’ coalescing with parents and older residents, which led to the 
vernacularisation in the social movement as well as the formation of horizontal and 
vertical alliances. This resonates with Arampatzi’s research (2017: 2162) with the 
Solidarity Network of Exarcheia in Athens. These place-based solidarities were 
constructed through struggle and managed to generate ‘new ways of relating to 
others’, especially for people not previously involved in political activism. In their 
research on women’s rights in Peru, China, India and USA, Levitt and Merry (2009: 
446) define vernacularisation as a process of appropriation and local adoption, 
arguing that by connecting with a locality, women’s human rights ideas take on some 
of the ideological and social attributes of the place, but also retain some of their 
original formulation. Older people who voted for the CHP mobilised for the first time 
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on the streets and created vertical alliances with some Kurdish youth to go against the 
Islamisation of the education together with the neo-liberalisation of urban space. 
While the formation of Don’t Touch My School! initiatives owes back to the late 
2000s, they culminated in the aftermath of the 2012 elections as a response to the 
radical changes in the education system. Between 2010–2011 and 2014 school years, 
‘when AKP focused on symbolic grand projects and ideological policy change that 
have normalised Islamic norms and rewritten Turkey’s national identity, the ratio of 
vocational and technical high schools increased by 23% and religious vocational 
schools increased by 73%. Parents, seeking a non-religious education, had 
significantly reduced choices, sometimes being forced into sending their children to 
religious schools despite their will’ (Lüküslü, 2016: 641-643). Prior to the Gezi, 
various Don’t Touch My School! initiatives met in front of the buildings of the 
provincial directorate of national education or squares. Following the Gezi, however, 
the main location for these initiatives has been the parks, such as the regular meetings 
at Göztepe Özgürlük Park to prevent Yeşilbahar Primary School’s transformation into 
a religious vocational school. In this movement, the centrality of discourses in 
protests related to the education system such as slogan-making was replaced by place-
making practices such as occupations and political forums in parks. 
The Validebağ Woods also became one of the ‘political parks’ or ‘spaces of 
hope’, whereby activists used and tested Gezi’s strategies. The local community 
around the Validebağ Woods aimed to counter the governments’ intentions to 
transform parts of it into commercial spaces for years since the activities of Validebağ 
Volunteers began in 1995. Their smaller movements turned into a bigger social 
movement with the participation of wider public when AKP government coveted 
some parts of this space to transform into a mosque right after the Gezi in 2014. 
Although the mosque was built in the woods in 2015, activists questioned 
conventional party politics and propagandist attitudes of traditional leftist parties 
within the wider movement that is commonly known as ‘Validebağ Resistance’. Arif 
Belgin, as an active member of the movement, articulated such tendencies within the 
Validebağ Volunteers that led to what is also known as ‘the small Gezi resistance’ in 
2014: 
 
The Validebağ Volunteers is an independent initiative, there is no reason for 
propaganda amongst us. We would organise within political parties if we want 
to, we all have that kind of consciousness, but we want to remain independent. 
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Of course, we have politically organised people in our community, but they 
work independently at the parks and forests. We do not want to spend time on 
consensus-building between groups from different political traditions. This 
way, we can take practical political action and protect Validebağ Woods 
against the government’s plans to construct a mosque and commercial 
enterprises. 
 
Evident here is a tension between ‘ecologic’ or ‘local’ initiatives and more 
conventional leftist political parties in a period when there is a passage from ‘speech 
to place-making practices’ (Cidam, 2017), which constitutes the defining features of 
the post-Occupy movements. Following the Gezi, conventional leftist parties like the 
TKP (Communist Party of Turkey) intended to discursively dominate the park 
forums. Concurrent with fighting against the neo-liberal and Islamist ideologies in the 
ground, activist communities also resisted the hegemonic tendencies of some leftist 
parties. My informants problematised the interventions of traditional leftist parties on 
their independent and DIY events in the parks, which might have prevented their aims 
to create an efficient ‘programme’ to counter the top-down urban interventions whilst 
hindering the ‘participatory’ aspects of their social movements. This points to a 
‘resistance within resistance’ and was a sentiment that was shared across many of my 
informants following the Gezi as the newly formed coalitions at the Gezi Park and 
other parks were less hierarchical, more heterogeneous and more practical compared 
to conventional political organisations in Turkey.  
During and following the Gezi, a lot of newer platforms were formed, which 
continued to use more participatory tactics and were concerned with urban 
regeneration and the destruction of ecology. Northern Forests Defense was one of the 
biggest and most influential of these newly formed groups. It was established during 
the Gezi on the 7th of July 2013 to go against ‘the creative destruction’ of the power-
holders such as the constructions of the 3rd Bridge, 3rd Airport and Istanbul Canal, to 
protect life spaces and bring together those who fight for ecology and rights. From 
their beginnings to the present day, the Northern Forests Defense used the forum 
structure and parks in their organisation. In their initial days during and right after the 
Gezi, this initiative used the Gezi Park as its spatial base for their weekly Friday 
forums. As the police forces heavily raided the Gezi Park, the collective started to use 
other parks to gather together, use and test Gezi’s strategies and enable wider 
participation. Creative practice such as the use of animal masks during 
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demonstrations was woven through their campaigns such as their ongoing 
organisation against nuclear power plants. 
The Northern Forests Defense took the most important decisions with the help 
of the forums in the parks. Towards the end of 2014, they moved into their own office 
in Beyoğlu but they have continued to use parks and woods for forums and camping. 
Despite all efforts of the Northern Forests, however, the 3rd Bridge and 3rd Airport 
construction had gone ahead, destroying the only remaining green space in Istanbul, 
namely The Northern Forests. Deniz from Northern Forests Defense problematised 
some aspects of the participatory dynamics within political parks and woods in the 
post-Occupy era:  
While our forum structure gives voice to everyone involved in the 
organisation, it sometimes leads to taking wrong decisions due to the 
cacophony of voices. For instance, when ten workers were killed at the 
Torunlar Center’s construction site in Istanbul after an elevator carrying them 
plunged to the ground in 2014, we went there following an emergency forum 
at the Belgrade Forests (we were supposed to camp there). We were exposed 
to so much gas and violence that halted our actions for a while because our 
members were hospitalised and taken into custody.  
 
Following the Gezi, the structure and operation of their ecological network 
transformed from one issue to multi-issue actions, including labour, work safety and 
right to the city. In relation to the participatory aspect of the new social movements, 
Smith and Glidden (2012: 289-290) describe the participatory dynamics of the 
Occupy as ‘tyranny of the structureless’. While these practices created alliances, 
Smith and Glidden’s research with Occupy Pittsburgh shows that the attention and 
energy focusing on consensus processes can detract from the work of movement-
building. These dynamics might lead to slow decision-making and planning actions 
with insufficient advance time, complicate receiving support from potential allies and 
obstruct a discussion of larger strategies as much time is spent on consensus-building 
among activists who do not share the same strategic goals’ (Smith & Glidden, 2012: 
289-290). Chou (2015: 47), similarly, argue that ‘horizontal and participatory as 
procedures were, certain individuals and factions nevertheless found themselves 
alienated, voiceless or left behind’. From a parallel perspective, newer alliances in the 
parks spent more time on negotiation and consensus-building, which, as it was in the 
case of the action at the Torunlar Center, might lead to wrong decision-making 
processes and impede some aspects of the movement-building.  
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Even after the failed coup in 2016, parks were still the main avenues for 
contentious political action. In the summer of 2017, the Justice Watches (Adalet 
Nöbetleri) and Conscience and Justice Watches (Vicdan ve Adalet Nöbetleri) were 
initiated by two main opposition parties in the parliament, CHP and HDP 
respectively, to go against the arbitrary detentions of senators, lift the state of 
emergency and help release two hunger strikers. The march, rally and watches were 
the most substantial signs of opposition to escalating authoritarianism following the 
coup. The Justice Watches started in Ankara and ended in Istanbul, but the Maçka 
Park became the nexus of these watches in Istanbul during the ongoing walk of the 
CHP senators along with the public from Ankara to Istanbul. While the Maçka Park 
continued to be a more-or-less ‘free’ and ‘safe’ space for CHP’s Justice Watches, 
which created a swell of public sympathy across Turkey, the Yoğurtçu Park was 
under police blockage during the Conscience and Justice Watches, organised by the 
pro-Kurdish party HDP. During the ‘Justice Watches’ of CHP, there were a lot of 
political events at Maçka Park, from concerts such as the concert of Ataşehir Youth 
Choir, to screenings of films, from demonstrations to the organisation of Earth Tables. 
The use of parks in creative and political ways owes back to the Gezi and activists 
referred to the Gezi in their talks during the park watches. One of the common 
slogans in the park was ‘we are no longer inside our houses, we are on streets to 
defend and promote justice!’, which was directly related to the re-use of the DIY 
activist spaces. As the buzzword for this movement was ‘justice for all’, lawyers were 
at the forefront of the movement. Accordingly, one of the most important marches 
during this movement took place from the Istanbul Çağlayan Justice Palace to the 
Maçka Park where lawyers walked with their traditional court dresses in the support 
of the public. Unions such as DISK (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of 
Turkey), Gezi-related groups like Birleşik Haziran Hareketi (United June Movement), 
or left-wing smaller parties and initiatives ÖDP (Freedom and Solidarity Party) and 
Halkevleri (Public Houses) also took turns in the watches, which accounts for the 
vernacularisation through political parks.  
Moreover, the ‘creativity’ behind the Justice Watches was a new addition to 
conventional mainstream political parties, especially concerning the CHP’s party 
politics, as they have long been status-quoist and statist. ‘CHP was perceived to be an 
advocate of “opposition for the sake of opposition” and not producing credible 
alternatives to AKP. For instance, they had long blocked potential solutions for the 
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issue of the headscarf and during the 2004 negotiations of the Cyprus problem, CHP 
policies aimed to maintain the status quo on the island. Their portrayal of major areas 
of public policy in black and white ultimately served to polarise political opinion, 
contributing to a lack of democratic consolidation’ (Ciddi & Esen, 2014: 420). Seen 
in this light, the Justice Watches that involved a multiplicity of participating 
organisations and wider population whilst relying on the use of sports, body 
performance and arts in the parks, took its basis from Gezi and instigated alternative 
possibilities for the future of oppositional party politics. Hunger strikers, however, 
were never reinstated back to their teaching jobs despite efforts of Justice Watches 
and Conscience and Justice Watches.   
The Earth Tables have not only been a part of Justice Watches with their 
place-making practices, but they have also been one of the most effective ways of 
actively using parks and squares. The anti-capitalist Muslims organised these Iftar 
protests that constituted of ‘ground-dining’ on the streets with chicken and rice, chips, 
salad, dates, olives, baklava, cookies and meatballs. Practicing Muslims and non-
religious communities have participated in the protests but the noteworthy interest of 
the latter group unfolded on the first Iftar protest during the Gezi on the 9th of July 
2013 by Taksim Square. Approximately 15.000 protestors sat and ate on the ground 
while collectively expressing their disapproval of the AKP. Earth Tables also 
functioned almost like food cooperatives as they also offer food to help people with a 
range of social problems including debt, housing or break-up. When I visited their 
cultural center in Fatih, they hosted homeless people as well as their members in 
need. This space was the center for their meetings but Earth Tables also widely 
socialised and politicised in parks and streets. İhsan R. Eliaçık (anti-capitalist 
Muslims) said: 
The Gezi Spirit changed our practices, especially in terms of questioning 
existing hierarchies in society and within our communities. Following the 
Gezi, we used parks, streets and squares as well as our own community centre 
for organising Earth Tables. We use public spaces to form communities and 
our centre to feed and host those who are in need. We also employ these 
spaces to create an alternative everyday life against capitalism. Through our 
Iftars and events at the parks and streets, we also build alliances with other 
communities in and across Turkey, for instance the Alevi foundations in 
Germany.  
 
While Earth Tables against capitalism that constituted of fasting on the floors in front 
of five-star hotels as a way of protesting the logic of Islamism and capitalism started 
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in the summer of 2011, the anti-capitalist Muslims formed alliances with a variety of 
political and cultural groups and received wider participation and recognition during 
and following the Gezi. In addition to Earth Tables, the anti-capitalist Muslims were 
at the forefront of other public demonstrations in and beyond the parks in Istanbul 
such as the banned 1st of May protests in Beyoğlu prior to and following the Gezi. 
Partly different from other political communities that I interacted with, the anti-
capitalist Muslims appropriated not only the parks in the popular centers of Istanbul, 
like the Abbasağa Park, but also used the parks around more conservative centres like 
the Fatih Saraçhane Park. This way, they were able to form vernacular encounters 
with the conservative populace of Istanbul. These social movements have also created 
solidarity economies as a strategic alternative to austerity (Arampatzi, 2017: 2064) or 
neo-liberalisation of religious practices such as the regime’s organisation of Iftar 
meals in five-star hotels. The cross-fertilisation with Alevis was also an important 
dynamic of anti-capitalist Muslims, which is not a common practice amongst Sunni-
Muslim groups in Turkey and it thus points to another form of vernacularisation 
amongst ‘the Children of Gezi’ with the help of ‘spaces of hope’. Recently, the anti-
capitalist Muslims’ leader İhsan R. Eliaçık, however, was sentenced to six years in 
prison in March 2018 and was banned from leaving Istanbul during the appeals 
period. 
 
6.Conclusions for New Directions in the Post-Occupy Period 
At first glance, the only remaining mobilisation might be seen as political rallies in 
this authoritarian context, but this paper aims to show that spatial forms of activism 
are still ongoing in Turkey, even if they are smaller in scope and their achievements 
are not in abundance in an authoritarian environment of violence and fear.  Although 
the post-Gezi period also points to an increasing density of competitive or neo-
authoritarianism in Turkey, this research goes against the previous scholarly work on 
social movement research that sees no opportunity for mobilisation in authoritarian 
regimes (Foweraker, 1995; Hinnebusch: 2006), by accounting for movement-making 
in authoritarian contexts. To provide empirical evidence to this claim, this paper 
brings together glimpses of how self-identified ‘Gezi’s children’ use spatial tactics to 
fight against Islamist neo-liberalism in the ground from mega-urban regeneration 
plans to the transformation of the education system. Offering a hint of the emerging 
forms of political voice and activism in the post-Occupy Turkey, this article sets out 
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newer forms of spatial engagement within social movements. It aims to show the 
ways in which activists do not coalesce officially in new social movements but 
through meetings/encounters in space by making tactical use of certain programmes 
of creative action and establishing vernacular encounters with new and existing urban 
networks.  
While their initial organisation and internal and external communication owed 
to their digital tools such as the struggle to keep BMT, the majority of existing post-
Occupy urban activism discussed by this article rely on spatial encounters and face-
to-face vernacular organisation in ‘spaces of hope’ in Istanbul. Relying on the 
repertoire of contentious political action from the Gezi, activists transformed parks 
into ‘spaces of hope’ in instigating spatial political action against the neo-
liberalisation of city and culture and Islamisation of everyday life in Turkey, such as 
the Islamisation of education, neo-liberal practices of Iftars and the authoritarian/top-
down regeneration of urban space in Istanbul. Following the failed coup, pro-
governmental groups also employed the same parks in Istanbul to keep watches 
against the coup forces but this paper aims to show the ways the Gezi’s children 
created hope out of these spaces. The article also delineates that while some of the 
Gezi’s strategies, such as the forum structure, turned out to be inefficient in the post-
Occupy situation, the parks as locations continued to serve as identity-places in the 
collective imaginaries of activists. An engagement with functional and inefficient 
features of the Occupy spatial practices would open new dimensions for the future of 
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i For the purposes of this paper, the Gezi Park protests is referred to as the Gezi. 
